In Creative Understanding, Roberto Torretti lays out a classification of possible relationships between physical theories by distinguishing four big types of relationships between two given theories considered in diachronic perspective: specialization, extension, reformulation, and substitution. Within the structuralist metatheory, this author and others also have propounded in several writings a diachronic typology of intertheoretical relations. Leaving besides differences of detail, both typologies reveal remarkable coincidences, although the structuralist typology is formally more precise than Torretti’s. However, in the last portion of (...) this article, I discuss a further type of intertheoretical relation in diachronic perspective, which, until recently, had not been considered by any approach in philosophy of science: what I call “crystallization” and is exemplified by the development of thermodynamics in the 19th century. (shrink)

BackgroundPreprint usage is growing rapidly in the life sciences; however, questions remain on the relative quality of preprints when compared to published articles. An objective dimension of quality that is readily measurable is completeness of reporting, as transparency can improve the reader’s ability to independently interpret data and reproduce findings.MethodsIn this observational study, we initially compared independent samples of articles published in bioRxiv and in PubMed-indexed journals in 2016 using a quality of reporting questionnaire. After that, we performed paired comparisons (...) between preprints from bioRxiv to their own peer-reviewed versions in journals.ResultsPeer-reviewed articles had, on average, higher quality of reporting than preprints, although the difference was small, with absolute differences of 5.0% [95% CI 1.4, 8.6] and 4.7% [95% CI 2.4, 7.0] of reported items in the independent samples and paired sample comparison, respectively. There were larger differences favoring peer-reviewed articles in subjective ratings of how clearly titles and abstracts presented the main findings and how easy it was to locate relevant reporting information. Changes in reporting from preprints to peer-reviewed versions did not correlate with the impact factor of the publication venue or with the time lag from bioRxiv to journal publication.ConclusionsOur results suggest that, on average, publication in a peer-reviewed journal is associated with improvement in quality of reporting. They also show that quality of reporting in preprints in the life sciences is within a similar range as that of peer-reviewed articles, albeit slightly lower on average, supporting the idea that preprints should be considered valid scientific contributions. (shrink)

Born on October 26, 1946, Carlos Ulises Moulines studied Physics, Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Barcelona, obtaining a Degree in Philosophy from that same University and a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Munich, supervised by Wolfgang Stegmüller. He is one of the most outstanding contemporary philosophers of science and one of the most prominent exponents of metascientific structuralism. In this interview he talks about biographical aspects, philosophy of science in general and specific topics, as (...) well as presenting his impressions on some topics related to academic life. (shrink)

These days, a number of philosophers of science indulge in lamenting about a crisis of their discipline. They complain about its loss of relevance, and bemoan the mar gi na lization of their dis cipline in the philosophical community and in the wider academia , Hardcastle and Richardson ). The Munich take on the philosophy of science does not succumb to this temptation. According to it, philosophy of science is well and alive. In Carlos Ulises Moulines’s Die Entwicklung (...) der modernen Wissen schaftstheorie Eine historische Einführung the word “crisis” is used only in reference to the 1940s when clas sical logical positivism encountered some dif fi culties in dealing with problems concerning veri fi cation, the ana ly tic/synthetic distinction, and similar conundrums. For Moulines, “crisis” is not a word that applies to contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

IN THE DISCUSSION on education in the Republic, Socrates lays down the principles which those who speak about the gods must follow if they want to avoid the errors of traditional mythology. The first typos of this rational theology is this: "God is the cause, not of all things, but only of the good." For "God, being good, cannot be responsible for everything happening in our life, as is commonly believed, but only for a small part. For we have a (...) far smaller share of good than of evil, and while God must be held to be the sole cause of good, we must look for some other factors than God as cause of the evil." Rightly celebrated, this passage has set the agenda for ages of reflection in Western thought on the cause of evil. In contrast to traditional mythology where the gods are seen as the origin of both good and evil--as Homer says, "Zeus has two jars standing on the floor of his palace, full of fates, good in one and evil in the other"--the divinity is now freed of all responsibility for evil. God, who is entirely good, can only be the cause of well-being. If this answer sets God free of all responsibility for evil, it seems to be at the cost of limiting God's power: for God is no longer responsible for "most things in human life," since most of them are evil. What, then, may be the cause or causes of evil? Do bad things have a cause? Or do they just happen? Plato's formulation seems to suggest that he favours a dualistic solution to the problem of evil: God is the cause of all good, but for evil we have to find other causes. What could those causes be: matter, cosmic necessity, an evil soul? Various answers of this type were developed in later Platonism and in later mythological philosophies. Without denying that Plato often uses a dualistic discourse and uses elements of it in his cosmology, I do think that Plato had something different in mind. After all, he was not primarily interested in the problem of theodicy. For in this passage of the Republic, he is not concerned with the problem of evil in the universe as a whole, which is really the theodicy question, but with evil in "human life," that is, evil insofar as human beings experience it and suffer from it: the fact that we are not at all living well but are instead miserable and unhappy. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to central concepts and ideas in Mexican philosophy. Couched in stories and anecdotes from the author's life, the book offers these concepts and ideas as orientations, recommendations, or exhortation for navigating today's world. The structure and the style of the book aims at making these accessible to both specialists and non-specialist or anyone who may have had some experience with contemporary forms of marginalization, alienation, objectification, or any of the various forms of dread and accidentality familiar (...) to modern life. This, the author thinks, is most of us. Narrowing down the scope of the tradition, the author draws from the history of Mexican philosophy in the 20th century, as it is at this time that Mexican philosophy comes into its own. The book begins with two short introductions, one is an introduction philosophy in Mexico, the other to Mexican philosophy. Here, readers are introduced to Alfonso de la Veracruz, who offered the first philosophy course in the Americas in 1540 in the monastery of a small town in Michoacán, Mexico. From there, it presents four main themes from Mexican philosophy that recur in the philosophical literature. The remainder of the book serves as a "guide" for living a better, more fulfilling life. The main characters in what the author considers an uncontroversial retelling of Mexican philosophy are Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos, Emilio Uranga, Leopoldo Zea, Jorge Portilla, Rosario Castellanos, Elsa Cecilia Frost, and, of course, persons in the author's own life. (shrink)

How can evil exist in a world governed by providence? That is the main question addressed in this chapter. To answer it, the author first sets out Proclus’ defence of providence, which combines the gods’ transcendence with their sharing goodness. The next step is to show that despite providence, evils have reality as well. There is, however, no substance or principle of evil, and only human and irrational souls and material bodies are susceptible to it. Evil’s having a ‘parhypostasis’ is (...) explained as its existing upon and alongside real existents; uncaused because a result of weakness, not power; not pure privation because parasitic on good existents, and hence a ‘subcontrary’ of the good. Finally, the author returns to the relation between providence and evil, showing that bodily evil fits the good of the universe, and that providence will punish evil souls in due course. (shrink)

As much in the processes of education of sciences like in the methodological and epistemological analyses, usually are not examples of social theories that they allow to show how they are resisted with the experience. This work tries to show not only the methodological skeleton used by E. Durkheim i..

Este trabajo defenderá la universalidad de la metáfora en arte (Arthur Danto), contra quienes piensan (Davidson, Carrol, Vilar) que en él la atribución de propiedades expresivas es literal y no metafórica. Se defiende la tesis de que la metáfora artística es como un símbolo tensivo que apunta a significados (epífora) y al mismo tiempo crea presencia (diáfora). Gracias a ambos elementos el arte crea presencia, crea realidad o transfigura lo usual y le otorga súbitas y asombrosas posibilidades de presencia, a (...) las cuales se corresponde no sólo con los sentidos, sino también con el afecto, el entendimiento y la imaginación. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to present a logical framework that allow to formalize a kind of prima facie duties, defeasible conditional duties, indefeasible conditional duties and actual (indefeasible) duties, as well as to show their logical interconnections.

This article aims to clarify the sharp contrast between the “short path” of Heideggerian ontology and the “long path” adopted by Ricoeur as a representation of the many necessary mediations in the constitution of his philosophical anthropology. Heidegger breaks into contemporary thought with the publication of his treatise “Being and Time” (1927) as a kind of direct settlement in the field of ontology. In contrast, Ricoeur is seen - and sees himself - as a thinker of conceptual mediations in his (...) long itinerary, since adherence to Husserlian phenomenology and subsequent hermeneutic inflection, passing through confrontations with Freudian psychoanalysis, structuralism and analytical philosophy, to the creation of the book “Oneself as Another” (1990). However, the two philosophers built their works on the common horizon of hermeneutics; therefore, are there possible points of convergence between them? And how could we interpret the relevance of this possible interlocution? These questions cannot be answered without a thorough comparative reading. This text does not intend to answer them, but only to suggest elements for further investigations. (shrink)

The existence of sovereign rights over genetic resources is today well recognized in international law. However, the legal status of such resources in terms of property rights is still unclear. The consideration of this issue requires a clear distinction between physical and intangible property. Legislation in developed countries has extended patent protection to genetic resources, in addition to the protection of plant varieties via breeders' rights. The extension of protection and the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement may have important implications (...) for breeding programs and trade in seeds. While intellectual property protection of genetic resources is rapidly advancing, considerable work is still to be done to ensure the compensation for the informal innovations made by local and indigenous communities. (shrink)

La logique spécifique des jugements de valeur est à chercher dans le discours rhétorique. Cette thèse développée par Ch. Perelman dans L'Empire rhétorique (1977) nous rappelle l'introduction à l'éthique de Jean Buridan (XIVe s.). Selon Buridan la philosophie morale ne peut se contenter d'appliquer la logique générale: elle a besoin d'une logique spéciale, une „logique morale” qui n'est rien autre que la technique persuasive qu'on étudie dans la Rhétorique. Roger Bacon (XlIIe s.) a même essayé d'intégrer cette rhétorique dans l'éthique (...) : elle est la partie pratique de la science morale. Bien que leur textes rappellent parfois les considérations de la ‘nouvelle rhétorique’, la relation entre l'éthique et la rhétorique y est envisagée d'une manière toute différente. Pour les auteurs médiévaux la rhétorique est une science auxiliaire de l'éthique : elle sert de liaison entre la théorie et la pratique. Dans la partie théorétique de l'éthique la logique ‘générale’ reste en vigeur. Ce n'est que pour mettre en pratique les règles et valeurs qui ont été ‘démontrées’ par la théorie qu'on a recours à la technique persuasive et sa logique ‘spéciale’. La rhétorique n'a donc qu'une fonction subsidaire. On retrouve la même conception au début des temps modernes chez Francis Bacon qui attribue à la rhétorique la fonction d'appliquer le dictamen rationis à l'imagination pour exciter ainsi la volonté. Une tout autre conception est défendue par l'humaniste Lorenzo Valla qui essaie de réintégrer l'argumentation morale dans le discours rhétorique où elle trouve sa place originaire. Notre propre point de vue est développé en confrontation avec Aristote, de qui nous avons hérité le projet d'une ‘science pratique’ et l'ambiguité qui en est inhérente 1° La rhétorique présuppose l'éthique. 2° L'éthique qui se veut epistème, ne relève pas de la rhétorique qui n'est qu'une technè. Elle se présente comme une science à caractère dialectique. 3° Les difficultés arrivent dès qu'on exalte la fonction pratique de cette science (cf. récemment R. Hare). Dès que l'éthique veut être efficace dans la vie concrète, elle devient une argumentation qui relève plutôt du discours épidectique (Weltanschauung). Notre société, en pleine crise morale, a certainement besoin d'un tel discours qui essaie d'intensifier l'adhésion à des valeurs morales. Mais il nous semble qu'il reste à côté d'un tel discours - en pleine expansion des nos jours - une place bien discrète pour une reflection critique qui en analyse les raisons : qui n'est pas inutile, bien que peu efficace. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to point out significant and meaningful overlapping between several styles of scientific thinking, as they were proposed by Crombie (1981) and discussed by Hacking (1985; 2009). This paper is divided in four sections. First, I examine an interpretation made by Barnes (2004) about the incompatibility among scientific styles. As explained by its author, this interpretation denies any possibility of similarities between styles of scientific reasoning. In opposition, the following sections of this paper include explanations (...) of relevant characteristics of Geometry, as stated in Euclid's Elements, which are also present in other three scientific styles: modeling, experimental exploration and taxonomic style (and some of the shared characteristics are even used to define such styles). By stressing out these characteristics I argue that these four styles discussed by Hacking are not so different from each other, in fact, they overlap and may even be abridged into one foundational style: geometric. El objetivo de este artículo consiste en explicar traslapes importantes y significativos entre varios estilos de pensamiento científico, tal como fueron propuestos por Crombie (1981) y discutidos por Hacking (1985; 2009). El presente artículo está dividido en cuatro secciones. Primero, se examina la interpretación de Barnes (2004) sobre la incompatibilidad entre diversos estilos. Según este autor, no existe posibilidad alguna de encontrar similitudes en los estilos de razonamiento científico. En oposición a esta interpretación, las siguientes secciones explican características relevantes de la Geometría, tal como fueron plasmadas en Los Elementos de Euclides, y que están presentes en otros tres estilos: de modelación, de experimentación y taxonómico (las características compartidas incluso definen algunos de estos estilos). Destacar estas características me permite argumentar que estos cuatro estilos discutidos por Hacking no son tan diferentes entre sí, de hecho, se traslapan e incluso pueden ser condensados en un estilo fundacional: el geométrico. (shrink)

Even though Pato ka never acheived a critique of the political limits of Husserl´s and Heidegger´s philosophies, he did clearly set the limits of those philosophies, limits after which the phenomenological philosophy of Patocka adopts a new dimension. En this paper we argue that vis-a-vis Husserl´s ..

Excerpt from Conocimiento y AccionY bien: cuando se afirma que el dogmatismo es indis pensable [para laa accion, y que el escepticismo fatalmente la paraliza. no se hara una afirmacion falsa o extre madamente exagerada, basada en lo que podria. Suceder, c en lo que pareceria. Razonable que sucediera, mas que en lo que sucede de hecho; mas en el raciocinio que en la observacion? Es precisamente lo que sostengo.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic (...) books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that time representation should be classified as agent dependent motor-intentional, agent dependent conceptual and agent independent conceptual. I employ this classification to explain certain features of psychological and cultural time and discuss how biological time constrains such features. The paper argues that motor-intentional time is a crucial psychophysical link that bridges the gap between purely biochemical cycles and conceptual-intentional representations of time, and proposes that the best way to understand the transitions from biological to psychological (...) time is to characterize them as phase transitions that emerge on the global properties of a system regardless of specific aspects of the underlying processing units. With respect to hierarchical models of time, the paper claims that although the hierarchical organization of constraints limits the number of possible instantiations of temporal information, informational phases have principles of organization of their own. Based on these proposals, I conclude that since information assembles itself into the temporal behavior of an agent, it is more accurate to call the principles governing such a behavioral unity a phase, rather than a hierarchy. To support these theses, the paper draws upon research in biology, neuroscience, philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

À plusieurs égards, il est vrai d’avancer que Maïmonide et Averroès poursuivent le même projet philosophique et religieux. D’autant plus que tous deux ont été décrits comme des disciples d’al-Fârâbî, le fondateur de l’école de l’aristotélisme arabe . Cependant, à première vue, leur oeuvre ne pouvait pas être moins ressemblante: Averroès n’a écrit presque exclusivement que des commentaires sur Aristote, cependant que Maïmonide n’est l’auteur d’aucune oeuvre qui appartienne à un genre philosophique dans le sens strict. Il est, d’un autre (...) côté, un commentateur distingué lui aussi - sauf qu’il n’explique pas Aristote, mais commente et met de l’ordre dans la Loi de Moïse. La question principale dont je traite dans cet article, est celle de savoir si ce rapport tellement différent à la philosophie et à l’exégèse chez Averroès et Maïmonide peut être compris comme deux façons d’implémenter le cadre conceptuel établi par al-Fârâbî. Je commence par examiner le projet d’al-Fârâbî, que j’essaie d’expliquer par deux objectifs: reprendre et continuer le projet de la philosophie antique et définir sa place dans une société, dans laquelle l’autorité de la Loi divine n’est pas mise en question. Ensuite, je montre que, tandis que l’oeuvre d’Averroès peut être comprise, dans l’ensemble, comme une continuation du projet d’al-Fârâbî, cela n’est pas vrai de la même façon pour l’oeuvre de Maïmonide qui en partie transforme al-Fârâbî de manière créative et en partie utilise des prémisses dont on ne trouvera pas la source en al-Fârâbî. La position de Maïmonide en ce qui concerne la philosophie et l’exégèse se distingue significativement de la position habituelle adoptée par les falâsifa, ce qui a eu des conséquences importantes pour la philosophie juive médiévale après Maïmonide. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on the importance of attention skills in the development of universal associative learning, and it explains why the centrality of attention in UAL presents a considerable difficulty for the UAL approach. Attentional abilities are not just developmentally related to UAL but are in fact explanatory of UAL. The main problem is that all the types of attention involved in UAL can be dissociated from consciousness. This means that while attention skills for UAL might be necessary for consciousness, (...) they are not sufficient because they can all occur unconsciously. Thus, the possibility that UAL capacities might not be sufficient for consciousness cannot be eliminated, thereby challenging the key claim of the UAL approach. (shrink)

Night: The presence of the absence, the dissolution of the person in the night, the horror of being, the reality of the unreal, it takes us more to the absence of God than to God, to the absence of every entity. Dawn: Not being conscious of the existence of that unchangeable supposed centre of the person within time does not mean that we cannot be able to explain the not static changeable and relational personal identity in other ways. Day: It (...) is me who flows, but I am not in the flow like a support from where life flows, I am flowing in my own reality. This is not similar to an egology, it does not mean that everything exists and is loved to me, but it does mean that everything is seen and loved for me. (shrink)